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Graham Ritchie, Director of the International Professional Training and Research 
Unit (IPTRU) at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, spoke at a conference on 
the Legal Protection of the Mentally 111, which took place at Maseru, Lesotho, on 
30 July   1 August. His report on the conference (below) is followed by an account 
of his presentation.
CONFERENCE REPORT
The Conference was opened by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Justice, and the Minister for Health and Welfare. The main thrust of the 
presentations, and the discussion by the participants, was 
concerned with the need to raise awareness levels with 
regard to the rights and dignity of mentally ill and 
incapacitated persons, not only among professional 
disciplines, but also in the general public. Great weight 
was placed upon the importance of continuing relevant 
training for the professionals involved in the various 
aspects of the care and treatment of mental patients.
The issue of empowerment of the mental patient was a 
topic which developed significant debate, both as regards 
principles and good practice to be adopted and followed, 
and in respect of the practicalities of enabling this to take 
place in day-to-day practice. These themes were examined 
from all the aspects which could be raised by an authoritative 
assembly of some 60 senior professionals and academics, 
judges, Government Ministers and their officials.
A significant theme of the conference was the mental 
health needs of children, and local concerns were 
illustrated by discussions turning on the problems of 
'street children'. A further area of local concern was the 
effect of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on mental health issues. 
Treatment of mental patients within the criminal justice 
system was another focus of attention, with particular 
emphasis on the question of detention within secure units 
of persons who are either not susceptible to treatment, or 
who are only temporarily seriously mentally ill. The 
lacunae in the Lesotho legislation were identified as 
meriting an early legislative cure. Indeed, it was generally 
acknowledged that the Lesotho statutes concerning mental 
health are very out of date, do not reflect present day 
psychiatric or lay thinking, and urgently in need of reform.
The role of the mental health professional in enhancing 
the rights of mental patients was considered in the light of 
the contrasting situations in Lesotho, South Africa and theo 7
UK. The need for improvements in practice was 
acknowledged, but changes in the legal framework were
o ' o o
considered to be an essential component for 
underpinning such developments. The role of the criminal 
law in providing protection for the vulnerable mental 
patient, especially in connection with rape and sexual 
abuse, was a further matter which gave rise to lively debate 
on the need for, and the direction of, law reform in this 
area.
As set out in the speech given by the Minister of Justice, 
and firmly stated by the Minister for Health in out-of- 
conference discussion, the government of Lesotho is 
committed to addressing reform of the law on mental 
health as a matter of priority. Ministries, the Attorney 
General, the High Court judiciary and the Lesothon have 
made repeated requests for assistance with this 
representative of the World Health Organisation. The 
culminating act of the conference was to make a number 
of resolutions for consideration by government.
PROTECTION OF THE MENTALLY ILL: A 
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE LAW, 
LESSONS LEARNED AND THE LEGISLATIVE 
WAY FORWARD
The history of modern psychiatry is accepted to have a 
beginning with the unshackling of manacled mental 
patients in revolutionary Paris in 1792. Pinel, the man 
responsible for transforming French society's perception 
of the mad as people who are alien, and of diminished 
humanity, into people who are just sick, and often curable 
men and women, caused a change in perception of the 
mentally ill amongst the medical profession. The 25
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perception of the mentally ill by society at large however, 
remains negative.
o
To the ordinary person, the mentally ill are strange and 
frightening. The mentally ill are beings not as we are and 
our interaction with them is artificial. We are inclined to 
see them as beings with less human dignity and we interact 
with them as though they are not quite members of the 
human family. Unlike other ill adults the mentally ill adult 
may sometimes receive treatment and care either against 
his will, or with his uncomprehending acquiescence. The 
treatment and care of the mentally ill is therefore often 
treatment without consent.
Consent of a patient has always been a necessary 
precursor to treatment. The case of Slater v Baker and 
Stapleton (1767) 2 Wils KB 359, is typical of this point of 
view, where the judge said that the need for a patient's 
consent was 'the custom and usage of surgeons'. The fact
o o
that mental patients do not always have the capacity to give 
consent to treatment in many instances means that 
legalism and 'medicalism' are inevitable bedfellows in the
o
treatment and care of the mentally ill.
The profession of psychiatry has therefore developed 
hand in hand with the development of administrative and 
legal controls of the power of psychiatrists. Unlike the 
perception of mental patients as being strange and not fully 
human beings, mental patients are fully human and often 
intelligent, articulate, and sensitive. Every human being 
alive could have the misfortune of a neurological or reactive 
mental illness, as every person runs the risk of falling victim 
to any physical condition. John Percival, a mental patient, 
gave an account of his treatment without consent in the 
1830s. He later acknowledged that he needed treatment
o
but the administration of this treatment reveals the 
attitudes to the mentally ill that always seem to apply.
John Percival wrote in his A Mad Peoples History of Madness 
(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, PA, 1982):
'Men acted as though my body, soul and spirit were fairly 
given up to their control, to work their mischief and Jolly upon. 
My silence, I suppose, gave consent. I mean that I was never told 
such and such things we are going to do; we think it advisable to 
administer such and such medicine in this or that manner. I was 
never asked; do you want anything? Have you any objection to 
this or that? I was fastened down in a bed; a meagre diet was 
ordered for me; this and that medication forced do\vn my throat, 
or in the contrary direction; my will, my wishes, my repugnance's, 
my habits, my delicacy, my inclinations, my necessities, were not 
consulted, I may say thought of. I did not find the respect paid 
usually even to a child.'
The 19th Century English poet John Clare revealed his 
pain of mental illness in his poem / Am:
'I am:yet what I am none cares or know, 
My friends forsake me like a memory lost, 
I am the self-consumer of my woes,
They rise and vanish in oblivion's host, 
Like shades in love and death's oblivion lost, 
And yet I am, and live with shadows tost. 
Into the nothingness of scorn and noise, 
Into the living sea of waking dreams, 
Where there is neither sense of life nor joys, 
But the vast shipwreck of my life's esteems 
And even the dearest   that I love the best 
Are strange   nay, rather stranger than the rest.'
In the United Kingdom the use of physical restraint, such 
as shackling patients to the wall on a permanent basis and 
keeping them naked and barely fed, eventually ceased to be 
acceptable to society at large. Legal intervention in the 
treatment and care of patients became formalised with the 
Lunatic Asylums Act of 1845. This act conferred control of the 
treatment of unsoundness of mind on the emergent 
psychiatric profession, subject to the supervision of the 
national Lunacy Commission. Psychiatrists formed the 
Association of Medical Officers of Hospitals for the Insane 
in 184, which became the Medic-Psychological Association 
in 1865. The regulatory strategy of the Lunacy Commission 
was to exercise surveillance of the use of coercive 
interventions, rather than to seek their total elimination.
Even though coercive restraint and heavy sedation were 
not viewed as recognised treatments for insanity, they were 
recognised as treatments for the control of disturbed 
behaviour. The various commissions  including the 
present United Kingdom Mental Health Act Commission 
  which have regulated the mental health sector and the 
supervision of the courts through the use of judicial 
review, have played an important role in shaping the 
perception of what is acceptable.
The entire debate revolves around the issue of 
confinement and treatment without consent. What can 
and cannot be deemed to be consent, and whether there 
needs to be consent to care as well as consent to 
treatment, is what is called 'care in fact treatment'. This is 
an important point because under the Mental Health Act 
1983 (England and Wales), there are statutory safeguards 
against inappropriate or oppressive uses of treatment 
without consent, but care is seen as a non-medical issue 
that does not need statutory safeguards.
The most recent source of inspiration for consideration 
of these issues, which have been with us since the early 
19th Centurv, and which will always be with us in the 
future, are the various conventions on human rights. For 
example the European Convention on Human Rights was used 
as authority to urge the introduction of greater procedural 
safeguards and tighter regulation of psychiatry. These 
procedural safeguards were incorporated in the UK Mental 
Health Act 1983. The aim was to introduce at the time a 
new legalism but to try to avoid a cumbersome and 
technical legal formalism.
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Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
requires that any decision to detain a person on grounds 
of unsoundness of mind to be free from arbitrariness (Van 
der Leer v The Netherlands (1990) 12 R 567). Three 
conditions must be satisfied before detention and the 
administering of compulsory treatment can take place:
(1) It must be reliably shown by competent medical 
authority, on the basis of objective expertise, that the 
patient is of unsound mind.
(2) The condition must warrant compulsory 
confinement.
(3) Continued confinement is dependent on the 
persistence of mental disorder (Winterwerp \ The 
Netherlands (1979) 2 EHRR 387).
We are therefore at a stage where the solicitor ando
writer Anselm Eldergill can justly say:
'Promoting liberty, protecting individuals Jrom the harm caused 
by those at liberty, and those not at liberty Jrom abuse by those 
who are at liberty, alleviating suffering, and restoring to health 
those whose health has declined, are all legitimate objectives, in 
that they reflect values embraced by virtually all members oj our 
society,' Eldergill, 1997: 45.
Such a situation is however under constant threat. The 
perception of people in general is that the mentally ill are 
strange, frightening, and dangerous. This is an atavistic
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response of the mentally well to the mentally unwell. It has 
existed throughout time and the consequences of this 
attitude have only been ameliorated by the developments 
described above. A minority of the mentally ill can of 
course be very dangerous and a statistically small number 
of murders and other crimes against the person areo F
perpetrated by the mentally ill. The response of UK 
society to this danger is the UK Government White Paper 
2000 on the reform of the Mental Health Act 1983. The 
thrust of the White Paper is to achieve the maximum 
protection of the public not only from those defined as 
mentally ill within the terms of the Men tal Health Act 1983, 
but also those who maybe deviants, inadequate, mentally 
disabled, people with an untreatable personality disorder, 
and perhaps less controversially untreatable psychopaths.
In order to protect the public from these categories of 
dangerous people proposed legislation runs the risk of 
removing the legislative, common law, and practice 
safeguards and protection of the mentally ill which has 
been built up over two centuries. The UK Government is 
not unresponsive to the fears expressed by professionals 
about the proposed changes and the White Paper on the 
subject is now to be subject to a continuing discussion for 
a further period of time.
The acutely mentally ill who need to be confined and 
provided with treatment and care on a compulsory basis 
are a relatively small minority. During 1999 the average 
number of compulsorily detained patients in England and
Wales on any one day was approximately 13,000. On any 
one day in England and Wales in 1999 there were a 
further 22,000 patients in hospital as voluntary patients, 
or patients who did not have the capacity to form an 
attitude, or to express an attitude of objection to their stay 
in hospital. These patients are known as 'informal 
patients' because they have not been admitted to hospital 
under legal compulsion as 'formal patients.'
The case of R v Bournewood Mental Health Trust, ex parte L 
(1998) 3 WER 107-128 raised the following issue: What 
is the legal position if an informal patient is making no 
attempt to leave hospital but if they had tried to do so they 
would have been physically detained?
At the Court of Appeal stage of this case it was decided 
that in a practical effect an informal patient would be a 
compulsory patient. In which case dien they should be 
made formal compulsory patients under the law, in order 
for them to benefit from the checks and balances and legalo
protections afforded formally detained patients. (That 
case is fully described in the 'The Bournewood fright,' G 
Ritchie, Amicus Curiae 14, February 1999).
The House of Lords overturned the Court of Appeal 
decision. The further case of R v Mental Health Act 
Commission ex parte Smith (1998) 43 BMLR 174, came to a 
parallel conclusion when considering whether 'care', (i.e. 
management, control, nursing, etc), was the same as 
'treatment' for legal purposes. This was an important 
question because the Mental Health Act Commission 
could supervise elements of 'treatment' but the 
Commission did not think that it had the authority to 
supervise 'care'. In this case the patient died because of a 
failure of 'care'. The judge in this case said that the 
Commission could investigate 'care', because, as he said:
'Any complaints arising out of the exercise of the power to 
detain, manage and control, and the duty to treat, are 
complaints in respect of which the Commission has jurisdiction. 
It seems to me that management, control and treatment alljbrm 
part of the package of compulsion which is the essence ojjormal 
deten tion .' (paraphrase) .
This means that anyone kept in hospital by legal process 
has the right for all aspects of the acts and omissions 
perpetrated on them in hospital to be scrutinised by the 
supervisory body the Mental Health Act Commission.
The 'Bournwood fright' case also illustrated the point 
that all the issues of legalism and medicalism being 
considered today have already been considered by our 
forefathers and that anv thought of developing or
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amending legal and medical practice in this area should 
take place in the light of what has happened before. @
Graham Ritchie, MA (Cantab), solicitor
Director of the International Professional Training and Research Unit 
(IPTRU) at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies
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